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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1991). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was there evidence presented, sufficient to establish 
a genuine issue of material fact, that these defendants knew, or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of a 
dangerous condition? 
Standard of Review: In deciding whether the trial court 
properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing 
party, the Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial court's 
view of law, but reviews it for correctness. Utah State 
Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 
632 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint? 
Standard of Review: The decision to allow an amendment 
of a pleading is discretionary with the trial court and will not 
be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion resulting in 




1. Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies to 
the trial court's order granting appellees motion below. The 
rule provides in pertinent part as follows: 
. . . The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. (Emphasis supplied). 
Rule 15(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to 
the second issue and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
A party may amend his pleading 
once as a matter of course at any 
time before a responsive pleading 
is served . . . otherwise a party 
may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court whereby written 
consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. . . . 
(Emphasis supplied). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff alleges personal injuries as a result of riding 
in an elevator on or about April 16, 1984. Plaintiff claims that 
after the elevator doors closed, the elevator intermittently 
raised and fell from floor to floor for a period of 40 minutes. 
R. at 2. Nearly four years later, plaintiff initiated this 
action on March 29, 1988. After more than two years from the 
time plaintiff had filed her original complaint, plaintiff moved 
2 
for leave to file a first amended complaint, which was granted 
March 3, 1990. R. at 59, 113. On October 9, 1990, plaintiff 
again sought leave to file a second amended complaint. R. at 
376. However, this time the court denied plaintiff's request. 
In plaintiff's first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges 
that these defendants knew, or should have known of the dangerous 
condition of the elevator and that defendants negligently, 
recklessly, and intentionally failed to repair the elevator and 
to warn plaintiff that the elevator was in a dangerous condition. 
R. at 144-150. 
At the time of plaintiff's accident in 1984, Lee Peterson 
was the property manager of the building's common areas. See R. 
at 385, f 5. Mr. Peterson was not aware at any time prior to 
plaintiff's accident of any problems with the elevators dropping 
or rising rapidly. See R. at 385, 5 5-7. Nor had Mr. Peterson 
received any complaints at any time prior to plaintiff's alleged 
accident that any elevator at the subject property had dropped or 
risen rapidly. See R. at 385 5 5-7. The only elevator problems 
that Mr. Peterson had actual or constructive knowledge of, prior 
to the time of the alleged accident were minor, generic 
maintenance problems common to all elevators. Mr. Peterson was 
not aware that an elevator could operate in the manner described 
by plaintiff in her amended complaint. The record contains no 
evidence of information known by or available to these defendants 
that would show the elevator was potentially dangerous. See R. 
3 
at 385 5 5-7. 
Kenneth L. Fullmer has been an elevator technician for 
more than 21 years and is responsible for servicing the elevators 
at 185 South State. As part of his job, Mr. Fullmer conducts a 
weekly inspection of the elevators at 185 South State. Mr. 
Fullmer testified that these elevators were "exceptionally good 
elevators." Mr. Fullmer also testified that the elevators were 
equipped with numerous safety devices and it would be 
"impossible" for the elevators to operate in the manner described 
by plaintiff. See R. at 385 f 8-10. 
Ross A. Harrison has worked as an elevator serviceman for 
approximately 18 years. Mr. Harrison serviced the elevators at 
185 South State for approximately a two-year period and 
experienced no unusual problems with the elevators. In the 18 
years that Mr. Harrison has been servicing elevators, he has 
never heard of an elevator operating in the manner described by 
plaintiff in her amended complaint. See R. at 385 f 11-12. 
Ted Bambrough has been an elevator technician for 29 
years and serviced the elevators at 185 South State. In all of 
Mr. Bambrough's experience, he has never heard of an elevator 
doing the things described by plaintiff. See R. at 385 5 13. 
Finally, Brent J. Russon, manager of the elevator company 
that serviced the elevators in question, has been in the elevator 
business for 23 years. Mr. Russon is familiar with the elevators 
in question and has been dealing with the building owners and 
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managers since 1983. Based on his 23 years in the elevator 
business, Mr. Russon asserted that it was impossible for an 
elevator to drop and stop and go and stop in the manner described 
by plaintiff. See R. at 386 f 14-17. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court was correct in finding that no material 
issues of fact existed evidencing that these defendants knew, or 
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the 
alleged dangerous condition of the elevator. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to allow plaintiff to file a second amended complaint more than 
two and a half years after plaintiff's original complaint was 




THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE DEPENDANTS KNEW 
OR BY THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE CARE SHOULD HAVE 
KNOWN OP THE EXISTENCE OP A DANGEROUS CONDITION 
The law is well settled in this state that to hold an 
owner or possessor of land liable for injuries to an invitee, it 
must be shown that the owner or occupier knew, or in the exercise 
of reasonable care, should have known, of the existence of a 
dangerous condition. Martin v. Safeway Stores. Inc., 565 P.2d 
1139, 1140 (Utah 1977); Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc.. 538 
P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smith Food King Store. 531 
5 
P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1973). 
The duty of a property owner, vis-a-vis a user of the 
premises, was the subject of the analysis by the court in Gregory 
v. Fourth West Investments, Inc., 754 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1988). 
The court in Gregory acknowledged that prior distinctions of 
"invitee" and "licensee" have been eliminated. The present rule 
is that owners have "a duty to exercise reasonable care toward 
their tenants in all circumstances." Id. at 91. The Utah 
Appellate Court then affirmed dismissal of the complaint against 
the property owner because there was no showing of actual or 
constructive knowledge of the alleged danger. In so holding, the 
court stated: 
The plaintiff must demonstrate 
that defendant knew, or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should 
have known, that a dangerous 
condition existed and that 
sufficient time had elapsed to take 
corrective action. 
Id. at 91. 
Plaintiff tries to avoid the application of this rule by 
arguing that the owner or operator of an elevator is somehow held 
to a higher standard of care. However, plaintiff cites no case 
law stating that owners and operators of elevators are insurers 
and that the actual or constructive knowledge rule does not 
apply. Rather, the actual and constructive knowledge rule has 
been applied to elevator negligence cases. 
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In Brown v. Crescent Stores, Inc. 776 P.2d 705 (Wash. 
App. 1989), plaintiff sued the Crescent Stores for personal 
injuries allegedly sustained from a fall in an automatic elevator 
owned and operated by Crescent. The door allegedly "shot out at 
her" with great force and struck her on the right side, causing 
her to fall inside the elevator. The court held, that even 
though the elevator operator had a duty for the safety of his 
passengers, it was not an insurer and the fact of an accident and 
resulting injuries alone did not give rise to liability. Id. at 
707. 
The court further stated that, Crescent would not be 
liable for the ordinary jolts and jerks that result in the 
ordinary experience of operating an elevator. Summary judgment 
was granted on all issues except Crescent's duty to provide 
manually operated elevators. The court remanded for trial to 
determine Crescent's liability on this limited issue only. 
Plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment on her 
allegations alone. (Rule 56(e)). Plaintiff has failed to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether these defendants 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known 
that the elevator in question was in a dangerous condition. No 
affidavits or other evidence from the record was produced by 
plaintiff to establish notice to defendants of the alleged 
danger. Despite plaintiff's mention of routine maintenance 
complaints, plaintiff has failed to produce any genuine issues of 
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fact that prior to plaintiff's alleged accident, the elevator in 
question had evidenced the kind of behavior that plaintiff 
alleges resulted in her injuries. 
Lee Peterson, the defendant's property manager and the 
person designated to receive maintenance complaints regarding the 
elevators had never heard so much as a rumor that the elevators 
had previously operated in a manner described by plaintiff. Five 
experienced experts in the area of elevator maintenance and 
repair all testified that they had never heard of an elevator 
operating in the manner described by plaintiff. Most of them 
think that such operation would be impossible. Absent some 
indication that these defendants, as owners of the building, were 
on notice of a possible hazard, it would be unjust to find 
constructive notice of an event that experienced elevator experts 
have never even heard of and do not believe could occur. 
Furthermore, regular inspection and service of the 
elevators did not provide these defendants with actual or 
constructive knowledge of any dangerous condition. The Utah 
courts have ruled that even if a duty to inspect exists, "that 
duty would not require discovery of a latent defect." Gregory v. 
Fourth West Investments Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988). 
In Gregory, the plaintiff sued his landlord for damages to his 
car resulting from the collapse of his landlord's shed while the 
shed was covered with ice and snow. The court applied the 
traditional rule and held that defendant owed no duty to the 
8 
plaintiff because the defendant did not know and should not have 
known of any dangerous condition existing in the storage shed. 
The plaintiff then argued that the defendant had a duty to 
inspect the storage shed and discover any dangerous conditions 
that may have existed. In response, the court stated that, "Even 
if we assumed that defendant had a duty to inspect, that duty 
would not require discovery of a latent defect." Id. at 91. 
In the case at hand, the alleged dangerous condition 
existing in defendant's elevator is obviously latent. As of this 
date, the alleged defect remains unidentified. The defect was 
not discovered during the course of weekly inspections by 
seasoned elevator technicians. 
As the above analysis shows, the trial court was correct 
in granting summary judgment. In this case, a great volume of 
tenants and occupants used the elevators at 185 South State on a 
daily basis. There was no complaint by anyone that the elevators 
ever acted in the manner which plaintiff alleges or were 
otherwise dangerous. Further, after the alleged accident, no 
defects could be found in the elevator and no other complaints 
were registered evidencing the type of behavior plaintiff 
alleges. Property owners are not insurers of the safety of those 
who come upon their premises. These defendants are entitled to 
some reasonable notice of a problem before they can be charged 
with negligent failure to maintain safe premises. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
The decision to allow the filing of an amended complaint 
is discretionary with the trial court as part of its duty to 
manage proceedings brought before the trial court. Girard v, 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). The appellate court will 
not disturb a trial court,s decision regarding the filing of an 
amended complaint absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 248. 
When analyzing whether to grant or deny a motion to amend, Utah 
court's have focused on three factors: (1) The timeliness of the 
motion; (2) the justification given by the movant for the delay; 
(3) the resulting prejudice to the responding party. Regional 
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
Appellate courts have upheld a trial court's denial of a 
motion to amend where the amendment is sought late in the course 
of the litigation, where there is no adequate explanation for the 
delay, and where the movant was aware of the facts underlying the 
proposed amendment long before its filing. Imperial Enter, Inc. 
v. Firemans Fund Insurance, 535 F.2d 287, 283 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Girard, 660 P.2d 248; and Wesley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983)• 
As pointed out in Regional Sales Agency, a trial court 
does not abuse its discretion when it considers as a critical 
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factor in supporting its denial of a motion to amend a complaint 
the length of time between the filing of the complaint and the 
filing of the motion for leave to amend. In Pope v. Lydick 
Roofing Co. of Albuquerque, 479 P.2d 375 (N. M. 1970), the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the trial courts denial of 
plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint filed over two years 
after the filing of the initial complaint. The court considered 
the length of time between the filing of the complaint and the 
filing of the motion for leave to amend as a critical factor 
supporting its denial of the motion. 
Similarly, in Appollo Tire v. United Bank of Lakewood, 
N.A., 541 P.2d 976 (Colo. App. 1974), the court upheld the trial 
court's decision denying plaintiff's motion to amend complaint 
two years and nine months after its complaint had been filed. In 
support of its decision, the court made the following statement: 
It (plaintiff) sought entry of a 
new party, deleted some of the 
original claims, and added some new 
claims, this litigation had already 
protracted and the granting of 
plaintiff's motion to amend would 
have required further lengthy delay 
in order that defendants might 
respond to the new claims for 
relief. 
Id. at 978. 
In the case at hand, the plaintiff filed her motion for 
leave to file a second amended complaint over two and a half 
years after the initial complaint was filed and approximately six 
and a half years after the alleged accident occurred. Moreover, 
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the trial court had already granted the plaintiff one opportunity 
to amend her complaint. Plaintiff has failed to state any justi-
fiable reasons for such delay in raising her additional claim. 
The plaintiff has been aware from the onset of this lawsuit of 
the facts underlying the proposed second amended complaint. 
Other important factors to be considered in deciding 
whether or not to grant leave to amend pleadings, are whether the 
proposed amendment will promote an economic and speedy disposi-
tion of the action, and whether the amendment will cause undue 
delay and prejudice to the rights of any of the parties to the 
action. Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 459 (Alaska 1983). 
One critical factor courts have considered in determining whether 
undue delay and prejudice will result from an amendment is the 
nature and extent of the amendment sought. 
For example, injecting a new cause of action into a 
lawsuit many years after the commencement of the suit and after 
the nonmoving party has done significant discovery may be 
prejudicial to the nonmoving party. In Kelly v. Utah Power & 
Light Co.. 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987), the plaintiff sought 
leave to amend her complaint three years after the filing of her 
original complaint. The court upheld the trial court's denial of 
her motion to amend. The court, in addition to considering the 
untimeliness of the motion, held that the plaintiff's attempt to 
inject a new cause of action into the lawsuit was prejudicial to 
the defendants. 
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In the case at hand, plaintiff's attempt to amend her 
complaint for the second time to inject a res ipsa loquitur cause 
of action is prejudicial because these defendants have been 
preparing for over two and a half years to defend only on the 
basis of premise liability. These defendants have engaged in 
substantial discovery, including the taking of depositions of 
several key employees and experts who were directly involved in 
the servicing and repair of the elevator in question. These 
defendants had no knowledge of this additional claim while 
discovery was taking place. Accordingly, these defendants did 
not seek information specifically related to the res ipsa 
loquitur claim. It would be costly, inconvenient, and difficult 
for defendants to retake depositions and engage in additional 
written discovery. 
All discovery in this case has been done with an eye 
toward defending only the premise liability claim. In Owen v. 
Superior Court of the State of Arizona. 649 P.2d 278 (Ariz. 
1982), the Supreme Court of Arizona stated: 
Denial (of leave to amend) is 
deemed proper exercise of the 
court's discretion when the amend-
ment comes late and raises new 
issues requiring preparation for 
factual discovery which would not 
otherwise have been necessitated 
nor expected, thus requiring delay 
in the decision of the case. 
Id. at 284. 
Because the plaintiff's second amended complaint seeks to 
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inject a new cause of action over two and a half years after the 
filing of plaintiff's original complaint and after the trial 
court had already granted the plaintiff an opportunity to amend 
her complaint, the granting of plaintiff's motion to amend would 
prejudice these defendants and cause further delay in this 
action. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint. The trial 
court was justified in its decision because plaintiff had already 
had opportunity to amend her complaint at one time and the motion 
to file second a amended complaint was sought late in the course 
of litigation. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to give any 
adequate explanation for her failure to allege res ipsa loquitur 
in her initial complaint or in her first amended complaint. 
Further, plaintiff certainly has been aware from the very onset 
of this lawsuit of the facts underlying her proposed second 
amended complaint. Consequently, this court should uphold the 
trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's motion to file a 
second amended complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in holding that the plaintiff 
had raised no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known that the elevator in question was in a dangerous 
condition. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its 
14 
discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to file a second 
amended complaint to assert a claim of res ipsa loquitur. The 
orders of the trial court granting these defendants motion for 
summary judgment and denying the plaintiff leave to file a second 
amended complaint should be affirmed. 
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